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DLD-012        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3768 
 ___________ 
 
 IN RE:  DALMA EDWARDS, 
        Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
 United States District Court for the District of New Jersey  
 (Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 1:10-cv-03360) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
October 15, 2010 
 Before:  BARRY, FISHER AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed :  October 26, 2010) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 On July 1, 2010, Dalma Edwards filed in the District Court a habeas petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the decision of the Bureau of Prisons to transfer 
him to a Residential Re-entry Center for only the final 90 to 120 days of his sentence, as 
opposed to the maximum twelve-month period allowed for by the Second Chance Act of 
2007.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1).  On September 17, 2010, Dalma Edwards filed this 
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pro se mandamus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, seeking an order to compel the 
District Court to rule on the habeas petition.   
 Mandamus is a drastic remedy available in only the most extraordinary 
circumstances.  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  
“A petitioner seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus must have no other adequate 
means to obtain the desired relief, and must show that the right to issuance is clear and 
indisputable.”  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).  In addition, as a 
general rule, the manner in which a court disposes of cases on its docket is within its 
discretion.  See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).  
 Nonetheless, mandamus may be warranted when a district court’s “undue delay is 
tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.”  Madden, 102 F.3d at 79.  The District 
Court’s delay in this case, however, does not meet that standard.  Edwards filed his 
habeas petition accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on July 1, 
2010.  On August 4, 2010, having accumulated the filing fee necessary for a habeas 
petition, Edwards moved to withdraw his previous motion to proceed IFP.  On September 
22, 2010, the District Court ordered the Respondents to file an answer to the habeas 
petition within thirty days. 
 Based on experience with a previous habeas petition, Edwards has a valid concern 
that his current habeas petition may not be adjudicated in a timely fashion.  See Edwards 
v. Samuels, No. 06-5785, 2007 WL 2746855 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2007) (dismissing an 
 3 
 
earlier habeas petition by Edwards challenging the execution of a previous sentence as 
moot, because Edwards had been released from prison custody).  Nonetheless, there is no 
indication of undue delay regarding Edwards’s current habeas petition.  Less than three 
months passed between the time Edwards filed his habeas petition and his mandamus 
petition.  Moreover, within days of Edwards filing his mandamus petition, the District 
Court ordered the Respondents to file an answer to the habeas petition.  The District 
Court’s order demonstrates that it is currently considering Edwards’s habeas petition and 
is doing so in an expedited fashion.  We cannot say that the delay in adjudicating 
Edwards’s habeas petition is “tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction” or “rise[s] 
to the level of a denial of due process.”  Madden, 102 F.3d at 79. 
 Accordingly, we will deny Edwards’s mandamus petition.  To the extent that 
Edwards’s motion to proceed IFP before this Court could also be construed as a motion 
to appoint counsel, the request for counsel is denied as moot.   
